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Proactive service migration for long-running 
Byzantine fault-tolerant systems 
W. Zhao H. Zhang 
Department oj Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cleveland Stote University, 2121 Euclid Ave., Cleveland, OH 44115, USA 
E-mail: wenbing@ieee,org 
Abst ract: A proactive recovery scheme based on service migration for long-running Byzantine fau lt-to lerant systems 
is described. Proactive recovery is an essential method for ensuring the long-term reli ability of fau lt -t olerant systems 
that are under continuous threats from malicious adversaries. The primary benefit of our proactive recovery scheme 
is a reduced vulnerability window under normal operation. This is achieved in two ways. First, the time-consuming 
reboot step is removed from the criti ca l path of proactive recovery. Second, the response time and the serv ice 
migration latency are continuously profiled and an optimal service migration interva l is dynamically determined 
during runtime based on the observed system load and the user-specified availability requ irement. 
Introduction 
We have seen increasing reliance on services provided over the 
Internet. T hese services are expected to be continuously 
available over an extended period of time (typically 24 x 7 
and all year long). Unfortunately, the vulnerabilities due to 
insufficient design and poor implementation are often 
exploited by adversaries to cause a variety of damages, for 
example, crash of applications, leak of confidential 
information, modification or deletion of critical data, or 
injection of erroneous information into the system. These 
malicious faults are often modelled as Byzantine faults [IJ, 
and they are detrimental to any online service provider. Such 
threats can be dealt with using Byzantine fault-tolerance 
(BFT) techniques, as demonstrated by many research results 
[2- 5]. BFT algorithms assume that only a small portion of 
the replicas can be faulty. When the number of faulty replicas 
exceeds a threshold, BFT may f.1il. Consequently, Castro and 
Liskov [2] proposed a proactive recovery scheme (for BFT) 
that periodically reboots replicas and refreshes their state, even 
before it is known that tht-y have failed. Furthermore, they 
introduced a term called window of vulnerability (or 
vulnerability window) referring to the time window in which 
all replicas are proactively recovered at least once. As long as 
the number of compromised replicas does not exceed the 
threshold within the vulnerability window, the integrity of the 
BFT algorithm holds and the services being protected remain 
highly reliable over the long term. 
However, the proactive recovery scheme in [2J has a 
number of issues. First, it assumes that a simple reboot (i.e. 
power cycle of the computing node) can be the basis for 
repairing a compromised node (of course, in addition [Q 
the reboot, which could wipe out all memory-resident 
malware, a copy of clean executable code and the current 
state must be fetched and restored, and all session keys 
must be refreshed upon recovery), which might not be the 
case (e.g. some attacks might cause hardware damages) as 
pointed out in [6] . Second, even if a compromised node 
can be repaired by a reboot, it is often a prolonged process 
(typically over 30 s for modern operating s)'Stems). During 
the rebooting step, the BFT service might not be available 
to its clients (e.g. if the rebooting node happens to be a 
non-f:1ulty replica needed for the replicas to reach a 
Byzantine agreement). Third, there lacks coordination 
among replicas to ensure that no more than a smail portion 
of the replicas (ideally no more than / replicas in a system 
of 3/+ 1 replicas to tolerate up to / faults) is undergoing 
proactive recovery at any given time, otherwise the service 
may be unavailable for an extended period of time. The 
static watchdog timeout used in [2] also contributes to the 
problem because it cannot automaticaily adapt to various 
system loads, which means that the timeout value must be 
set to a conservative value based on the worst-case scenario. 
The staggered proactive recovery scheme in [2] is not 
sufficient to prevent this problem from happening if the 
timeout value is set too short. Recognising these issues, a 
number of researchers have proposed various methods to 
enhance the original proactive recovery scheme. 
The issue of uncoordinated proactive recovery due to system 
asynchrony has been studied by Sousa et al. [7, 8]. They resort 
to the use of a synchronous subsystem to ensure the timeliness 
of each round of proactive recovery. In particular, the proactive 
recovery period is determined a priori based on the worst-case 
execution time so that even under heavy load, there will be no 
more than f replicas going through proactive recovery. 
The impact of proactive recovery schemes on system 
availability has also been studied by Sousa et al. [9] and Reiser 
and Kapitza [10]. In the former scheme, extra replicas are 
introduced to the system and they actively participate in 
message ordering and execution so that the system is always 
available when some replicas are undergoing proactive 
recovery. In the latter scheme [10], a new replica is launched 
by the hypervisor on the same node when an existing replica 
is to be rebooted for proactive recovery so that the availability 
reduction is minimised. 
In this paper, we present an alternative proactive recovery 
scheme based on service migration. Similar to the work in 
[7–10], the objective of our approach is to provide proactive 
recovery for long-running BFT applications without suffering 
from the issues of [2]. In the following, we first present an 
overview of our scheme and then compare with similar 
approaches reported in [7–10]. 
Our proactive recovery scheme requires the availability of a 
pool of standby computing nodes in addition to the active 
nodes where the replicas are deployed. Furthermore, we 
assume the availability of a trusted configuration manager. 
The main components for our scheme are shown in Fig. 1. 
The basic idea is outlined below. Periodically, the replicas 
initiate a proactive recovery by selecting a set of active replicas 
and a set of target standby nodes for a service migration. At 
the end of the service migration, the target nodes are 
promoted to the group of active nodes and the source active 
nodes will be put under a series of preventive sanitising and 
repairing steps (such as rebooting and swapping in a clean 
system withFigure 1 Main components of the BFT 
migration-based proactive recovery 
hard drive with the original system binaries) before they are 
assigned to the pool of standby nodes. The sanitising and 
repairing step is carried out off the critical path of proactive 
recovery and, consequently, it could lead to a smaller 
vulnerability window under normal operation and has 
minimum negative impact on the availability of the services 
being protected. In addition, our migration-based proactive 
recovery scheme also ensures a coordinated periodical recovery 
and the dynamic adjustment of the proactive recovery period 
based on the synchrony of the system and the load, which 
prevents harmful excessive concurrent proactive recoveries. 
As can be seen from previous descriptions, although our 
scheme largely shares the same objectives with similar 
approaches [7–10], they differ significantly in a number of 
ways. 
To prevent uncoordinated proactive recovery, our scheme 
relies on an explicit coordination mechanism, while the 
approach proposed by Sousa et al. [7, 8] resorts to a priori 
worst-case execution time estimation. Furthermore, the 
proactive recovery period in [7, 8] is fixed throughout the life-
cycle of the application. Inevitably, the proactive recovery 
period has to be set pessimistically, which would lead to a 
potentially large window of vulnerability. Even though we 
also require a priori worst-case execution time estimation, in 
our scheme the proactive recovery period can be dynamically 
adjusted depending on the observed system load. When the 
system load is light, the vulnerability window can be reduced 
accordingly, even if it is set to a large conservative value in the 
beginning of the execution. However, we should note that 
under certain attacks, in particular, the denial-of-service 
attacks, the advantage of our scheme over other approaches 
disappears. 
The ways to attain better availability are also very different 
between our scheme and others [9, 10], despite the fact that 
all these approaches require the availability of extra replicas. It 
might appear that our scheme is rather similar to that in [10], 
because in both schemes a correct replica is made ready at the 
beginning of each round of proactive recovery. The major 
difference is that in our scheme the correct replica is 
located on a different physical node, while in the scheme of 
[10] the new replica is launched in a different virtual 
machine located in the same physical node. Apparently, in 
the scheme of [10], the proactive recovery time could be 
shorter and fewer physical nodes are needed, which reduces 
the hardware and software costs. However, our scheme 
offers better fault isolation. In particular, if an attack has 
caused physical damage on the node that hosts the replica 
to be recovered, or it has compromised the hypervisor of 
the node [11], the new replica launched in the same node 
in the scheme of [10] is likely to malfunction. 
The difference between our scheme and that in [9] is more 
subtle. In our scheme, the number of active replicas remains 
the optimal value (i.e. 3f þ 1) and the standby replicas (i.e. 
extra replicas) do not participate in normal server processing 
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(unless they are promoted to the active replicas pool) and they 
are not directly accessible from external clients. In the scheme 
of [9], on the other hand, the recovering replicas are regarded 
as failed, and therefore a higher degree of replication is 
needed to tolerate the same number of Byzantine faults and 
all the replicas would have to participate in the Byzantine 
agreement process. Consequently, our scheme has a number 
of advantages: (a) the replicated server operation could be 
more efficient because there are fewer multicast messages due 
to the use of an optimal number of active replicas, (b) the 
standby nodes are less likely to be compromised because they 
are isolated from the active replicas, and (c) the standby nodes 
can be probed more frequently without reducing the system 
performance. 
Finally, because of the use of a pool of standby nodes, our 
scheme makes it possible to carry out time-consuming repairs 
of faulty nodes (possibly with physical damages due to 
attacks), which is not addressed by the work of [7–10]. 
System model 
The nature of this research entails a synchrony requirement on 
the system, that is, we assume that all message exchanges and 
processing related to proactive recovery can be completed 
within a bounded time. However, the safety property of the 
Byzantine agreement on all proactive recovery-related 
decisions (such as the selection of source nodes and 
destination nodes for service migration) is maintained without 
any system synchrony requirement. 
As shown in Fig. 1, to enable the migration-based proactive 
recovery, the BFT system contains three main components: 
a pool of nodes for active server replicas, a pool of standby 
nodes and a trusted configuration manager. Each of the three 
components is deployed at a separate subnet for fault isolation 
and they are connected by an advanced managed switch such 
as Cisco Catalyst 6500. Each node in the pool of active nodes 
and the pool of standby nodes has three network interfaces: 
NIC1 for connection to external clients, NIC2 for connection 
between the two pools of nodes and NIC3 for connection to 
the configuration manager. However, only an active node 
(running a server replica) has all three interfaces enabled. A 
standby node has NIC1 disabled. The trusted configuration 
manager can dynamically enable and disable the NIC1 and 
NIC2 interfaces of any node, for example, it disables NIC1 
when removing a node from the pool of active nodes and it 
enables NIC1 when promoting a standby node to the pool of 
active nodes. 
We assume that there are 3f þ 1 active nodes to tolerate up to 
f Byzantine faulty replicas [2, 12]. The pool size of standby 
nodes (� f ) should be large enough to repair damaged nodes 
while enabling frequent service migration for proactive 
recovery. Both active nodes and standby nodes can be subject 
to malicious attacks (in addition to other non-malicious faults 
such as hardware failures). However, we assume that the far 
adversaries (either malicious clients or those impersonated as 
clients) via malformed requests to the replicated server. In 
light of this assumption, the system is configured such that 
the standby nodes are not directly accessible by external 
entities (i.e. NIC1 is disabled). The purpose of this 
configuration is to ensure that the rate of successful attacks on 
the standby nodes is much smaller than that on active nodes. 
Similar to [8, 9], we assume a fail-stop model on the 
trusted configuration manager. To ensure high availability, 
the trusted configuration manager is replicated using the 
Paxos algorithm [13]. The duty of the trusted configuration 
manager is similar to what has been described in [6], that 
is, it is used to manage the pool of standby nodes and to 
assist service migration. Example tasks include frequently 
probing and monitoring the health of each standby node 
and repairing any faulty node detected. 
Other assumptions regarding the system are similar to those 
in [2] and they are summarised here. All communicating 
entities (clients, replicas and standby nodes) use a secure hash 
function such as SHA1 to compute the digest of a message 
and use the message authentication codes (MACs) to 
authenticate messages exchanged, except for key exchange 
messages, which are protected by digital signatures. For 
point-to-point message exchanges, a single MAC is included 
in each message, whereas multicast messages are protected by 
an authenticator. Each entity has a pair of private and public 
keys. The active and standby nodes are each equipped with a 
secure coprocessor and sufficiently large read-only memory. 
In these nodes, the private key is stored in the coprocessor 
and all digital signing and verification is carried out by the 
coprocessor without revealing the private key. The read-only 
memory is used to store the execution code for the server 
application and the BFT framework. We do not require the 
presence of a hardware watchdog timer because of the 
coordination of migration and the existence of a trusted 
configuration manager. Finally, we assume that an adversary 
is computational bound so that it cannot break the above 
authentication scheme. 
3 Proactive service migration 
mechanisms 
The proactive service migration mechanisms collectively ensure 
the following objectives: (a) to ensure that correct active replicas 
have a consistent membership view of the available standby 
nodes, (b) to determine when to migrate and how to initiate a 
migration, (c) to determine the set of source and target nodes 
for migration, (d) to transfer a correct copy of the system state 
to the new replicas, and (e) to notify the clients the new 
membership after each proactive recovery. 
3.1 Standby nodes registration 
Each standby node is controlled by the trusted configuration 
manager and is undergoing constant probing and 
majority of malicious attacks are imposed by external sanitisation procedures such as reboot. If the configuration 
manager suspects the node to be faulty and cannot repair it 
automatically, a system administrator will be called in to 
manually fix the problem. Each time a standby node 
completes a sanitisation procedure, it notifies the active 
replicas with a JOIN-REQUEST message in the form of 
k JOIN-REQUEST, l , i l , where l is the counter values sis
maintained by the secure coprocessor of the standby node, is 
is the identifier of the standby node and sis is the 
authenticator. The registration protocol is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
An active replica accepts the JOIN-REQUEST if it has not 
accepted one from the same standby node with the same or 
greater l. The JOIN-REQUEST message, once accepted by the 
primary, is ordered the same way as a regular message with a 
sequence number nr, except that the primary also assigns a 
timestamp as the join time of the standby node and 
piggybacks it with the ordering messages. The total ordering 
of the JOIN-REQUEST is important so that all active nodes 
have the same membership view of the standby nodes. The 
significance of the join time will be elaborated later in this 
section. 
When a replica executes the JOIN-REQUEST message, it 
sends a JOIN-APPROVED message in the form of k JOIN-
APPROVED, l , n l to the requesting standby node. The r si 
requesting standby node must collect 2f þ 1 consistent 
JOIN-APPROVED messages with the same l and nr from 
different active replicas. The standby node then initiates a 
key exchange with all active replicas for future communication. 
A standby node might go through multiple rounds of 
proactive sanitisation before it is selected to run an active 
replica. The node sends a new JOIN-REQUEST reconfirming 
its membership after each round of sanitisation. The active 
replicas subsequently update the join time of the standby node. 
It is also possible that the configuration manager deems a 
registered standby node as faulty and it requires a lengthy 
repair, in which case the configuration manager deregisters 
the faulty node from active replicas by sending a LEAVE­
REQUEST. The LEAVE-REQUEST is handled by the active 
replicas in a similar way as that for JOIN-REQUEST. 
Figure 2 Protocol used for a standby node to register with 
active replicas
 
3.2 Proactive service migration 
3.2.1 When to initiate a proactive service 
migration? The proactive service migration is triggered by 
the software-based migration timer maintained by each 
replica. The timer is reset and restarted at the end of each 
round of migration. An on-demand service migration may 
also be carried out upon the notification from the 
configuration manager (to be discussed later). 
We require the user to specify several parameters: 
1. The maximum response time to order and execute a request 
0T oe based on the worst-case analysis. Note that T oe
0 does not 
include the queueing delay for the request being ordered. 
2. The minimum number of requests served p0 during each 
proactive service migration round. 
3. The maximum latency to carry out a service migration T s
0, 
that is, the maximum time it takes to swap out an active 
replica and to replace it with a clean standby replica. 
Based on these parameters, our proactive service migration 
mechanism determines an initial migration timeout value T 0 w 
and dynamically adjusts the migration timeout value Tw at 
runtime. The timeout value is capped by the initial timeout 
value to prevent an adversary from indefinitely increasing 
the proactive recovery period. 
The initial timeout value T 0 is set to be pT 0 . The user-w oe
provided parameters also implicitly specify a target availability 
A0 of the system: 
T 0 oeA0 ¼ p (1)
p0T 0 þ T 0 oe s 
A0 corresponds to the availability under the worst-case scenario. 
During runtime, our mechanism continuously measures the 
average response time Toe to order and execute a request for 
the most recent p0 requests, and the service migration latency 
Ts. A notification is sent to the system administrator if either 
the response time or the service migration latency exceeds the 
worst-case values. The migration timeout value Tw is 
dynamically adjusted to pT , where the parameter p isoe
calculated based on the following equation 
! 
A0T
p ¼ max p0, s (2)
(1 A0)Toe
to satisfy both the requirements on the minimum number of 
requests served in each migration period and the target system 
availability. 
3.2.2 How to initiate a proactive service 
migration? How to properly initiate a proactive service 
migration is quite tricky. We cannot depend on the primary 
to initiate a proactive recovery because it might be faulty. 
Therefore, the migration initiation must involve all replicas. 
On expiration of the migration timer, a replica chooses a 
set of f active replicas and a set of f standby nodes, and 
multicasts an INIT-MIGRATION request to all other 
replicas in the form kINIT-MIGRATION, v, l , S, D, il ,si 
where v is the current view, l is the migration number 
(determined by the number of successful migration rounds 
recorded by replica i), S is the set of identifiers for the 
f active replicas to be migrated, D is the set of identifiers 
for the f standby nodes as the targets of the migration, i is 
the sending replica id and si is the authenticator for the 
message. 
On receiving an INIT-MIGRATION message, a replica j 
accepts the message and stores the message in its data 
structure provided that the message carries a valid 
authenticator, it has not accepted an INIT-MIGRATION 
message from the same replica i in view v with the same or 
higher migration number, and the replicas in S and D are 
consistent with the sets determined by itself according to 
the selection algorithm (to be introduced next). 
Each replica waits until it has collected 2f þ 1 INIT­
MIGRATION messages from different replicas (including its 
own INIT-MIGRATION message) before it constructs a 
MIGRATION-REQUEST message. The MIGRATION-REQUEST 
message has the form kMIGRATION-REQUEST, v, l , S, Dlsp. 
The primary, if it is correct, should place the MIGRATION­
REQUEST message at the head of the request queue and 
order it immediately. The primary orders the MIGRATION­
REQUEST in the same way as that for a normal request 
coming from a client, except that (a) it does not batch the 
MIGRATION-REQUEST message with normal requests and 
(b) it piggybacks the MIGRATION-REQUEST and the 2f þ 1 
INIT-MIGRATION messages (as a proof of validity of the 
migration request) with the PRE-PREPARE message. The 
reason for ordering the MIGRATION-REQUEST is to ensure 
a consistent synchronisation point for migration at all 
replicas. An illustration of the migration initiation protocol 
is shown as part of Fig. 3. 
Figure 3 Proactive service migration protocol
 
Each replica starts a view change timer when the 
MIGRATION-REQUEST message is constructed so that a 
view change will be initiated if the primary is faulty and 
does not order the MIGRATION-REQUEST message. The 
new primary, if not faulty, should continue this round of 
proactive migration. 
3.2.3 Migration set selection: The selection of the set 
of active replicas to be migrated is relatively straightforward. It 
takes four rounds of migration (each round for f replicas) to 
proactively recover all active replicas at least once. The replicas 
are recovered according to the reverse order of their 
identifiers, similar to that used in [2]. For example, for the 
very first round of migration, replicas with identifiers of 3f, 
3f 2 1, . . . , 2f þ 1 will be migrated, and this will be followed 
by replicas with identifiers of 2f, 2f 2 1, . . . , f þ 1 in  the  
second round, replicas with identifiers of f, f 2 1, . . . , 1  in  
the third round and finally replicas with identifiers of 0, 
3f, . . . , 2f þ 2 in the fourth round. Note that only replica 0 is 
required to be migrated in the fourth round. We choose to 
migrate f replicas in this round anyway because (a) it is easier 
to implement this selection algorithm and (b) the cost of 
having f parallel proactive recovery operations is not much 
more than that of a single replica, as analysed in [2]. (The  
example assumed f . 2. It is straightforward to derive the 
selections for the cases when f ¼ 1, 2.) The selection is 
deterministic and can be easily computed based on the 
migration number. Note that the migration number 
constitutes part of the middleware state and will be transferred 
to all recovering replicas. The selection is independent of the 
view the replicas are in. 
The selection of the set of standby nodes as the target of 
migration is based on the elapsed time since the standby 
nodes were last sanitised. That is why each replica keeps 
track of the join time of each standby node. For each round 
of migration, the f standby nodes with the least elapsed time 
will be chosen. This is because the probability of these nodes 
to have been compromised at the time of migration is the 
least (assuming brute-force attacks by adversaries). 
3.2.4 Migration synchronisation point 
determination: It is important to ensure that all (correct) 
replicas use the same synchronisation point when performing 
the service migration. This is achieved by ordering the 
MIGRATION-REQUEST message. The primary starts to order 
the message by sending a PRE-PREPARE message for the 
MIGRATION-REQUEST to all backups, as described previously. 
A backup verifies the piggybacked MIGRATION-REQUEST 
in a similar fashion as that for the INIT-MIGRATION 
message, except now the replica must check that it has 
received all the 2f þ 1 init-migration messages that the 
primary used to construct the MIGRATION-REQUEST, and 
the sets in S and D match those in the INIT-MIGRATION 
messages. The backup requests the primary to retransmit 
any missing INIT-MIGRATION messages. The backup accepts 
the PRE-PREPARE message for the MIGRATION-REQUEST 
provided that the MIGRATION-REQUEST is correct and it has 
not accepted another PRE-PREPARE message for the same 
sequence number in view v. From now on, the replicas 
execute according to the three-phase BFT algorithm [2] as 
usual until they commit the MIGRATION-REQUEST. 
3.2.5 State transfer: When it is ready to execute the 
MIGRATION-REQUEST, a replica i takes a checkpoint of its 
state (both the application and the BFT middleware state), 
and multicasts a MIGRATE-NOW message to the f standby 
nodes selected and all replicas of the configuration 
manager. The MIGRATE-NOW message has the form 
kMIGRATE-NOW, v, n, C, P, il , where n is the sequence si 
number assigned to the MIGRATION-REQUEST, C is the 
digest of the checkpoint and P contains f tuples. Each 
tuple contains the identifiers of a source-node and target-
node pair ks, d l. The standby node d, once it completes the 
proactive recovery procedure, assumes the identifier s of the 
active node it replaces. A replica sends the actual 
checkpoint (together with all queued request messages, if it 
is the primary) to the target nodes in separate messages. 
If a replica belongs to the f nodes to be migrated, it is 
expected to disable the NIC1 interface and stops accepting 
new request messages. Of course, if the replica is faulty, it 
might not do that. That is why the trusted configuration 
manager must be informed of the migration by all correct 
active replicas (it will take action only if it has received 
f þ 1 migration-now notifications). In case the faulty 
replica fails to comply, the configuration manager changes 
the switch configuration to forcefully disable the NIC1 
interface (from the switch end) and performs other 
sanitising operations on the faulty node. 
Before a standby node can be promoted to run an active 
replica, it must collect 2f þ 1 consistent MIGRATE-NOW 
messages with the same sequence number and the digest of 
the checkpoint from different active replicas. Once a 
standby node obtains a stable checkpoint, it applies the 
checkpoint to its state and starts to accept clients’ requests 
and participate in the BFT algorithm as an active replica. 
3.3 New membership notification 
A faulty node could continue sending messages to the active 
replicas and clients, even if it has been migrated, before it is 
sanitised by the configuration manager. It is important to 
inform the clients of the new membership so that they can 
ignore such messages sent by the faulty replica. The 
membership information is also important for clients to 
accept messages sent by new active replicas and to send 
messages to these replicas. This is guaranteed by the new 
membership notification mechanism. 
The new membership notification is performed in a lazy 
manner to improve the performance unless a new active 
replica which inrole, primarytheassumes case the 
notification is sent immediately to all known clients (so 
that the clients can send their requests to the new primary). 
Furthermore, the notification is sent only by the existing 
active replicas (i.e. not the new active replicas because the 
clients do not know them yet). Normally, the notification is 
sent to a client only after the client has sent a request that 
is ordered after the MIGRATION-REQUEST message, that is, 
the sequence number assigned to the client’s request is 
bigger than that of the MIGRATION-REQUEST. 
The notification message has the form kNEW-
MEMBERSHIP, v, n, P, il (basically the same as thesi 
MIGRATION-NOW message without the checkpoint), where 
v is the view in which the migration occurred, n is the 
sequence number assigned to the MIGRATION-REQUEST 
and P contains the tuples of the identifiers for the replicas 
in the previous and the new membership. 
3.4 On-demand migration 
On-demand migration can happen when the configuration 
manager detects a node to be faulty after it has been 
promoted to run an active replica. It can also happen when 
replicas have collected solid evidence that one or more 
replicas are faulty, such as a lying primary. The on-demand 
migration mechanism is rather similar to that for proactive 
recovery, with only two differences: (a) The migration is 
initiated on-demand, rather than by a migration timeout. 
However, replicas must still exchange the INIT-MIGRATION 
messages before the migration can take place. (b) The 
selection procedure for the source node is omitted because 
the nodes to be swapped out are already decided, and the 
same number of target nodes are selected accordingly. 
4 Performance evaluation 
The proactive service migration mechanisms have been 
implemented and incorporated into the BFT framework 
developed by Castro et al. [2, 3]. Owing to the potential 
large state, an optimisation has been made, that is, instead 
of every replica sending its checkpoint to the target nodes 
of migration, only one actually sends the full checkpoint. 
The target node can verify if the copy of the full 
checkpoint is correct by comparing the digest of the 
checkpoint with the digests received from other replicas. If 
the checkpoint is not correct, the target node asks for a 
retransmission from other replicas. 
Similar to [2], the performance measurements are carried 
out in general-purpose servers without hardware coprocessors. 
The related operations are simulated in software. 
Furthermore, the trusted configuration manager is not fully 
implemented because we currently lack the sophisticated 
hardware equipment that could facilitate the dynamic 
control of subnet formation. All the components (the 
configuration manager, the three pools of replicas and the 
clients) are located in the same physical local area network. 
The motivation of the measurements is to assess the 
runtime performance of the proactive service migration 
scheme. 
Our testbed consists of a set of Dell SC440 servers 
connected by a 100 Mbps local-area network. Each server 
is equipped with a single Pentium dual-core 2.8 GHz CPU 
and 1 GB of RAM, and runs the SuSE Linux 10.2 
operating system. The micro-benchmarking example 
included in the original BFT framework is adapted as the 
test application. The request and reply message length is 
fixed at 1 kB, and each client generates requests 
consecutively in a loop without any think time. Each server 
replica injects a 1 ms processing delay (using busy waiting) 
to simulate some actual workload before it echoes the 
payload in the request back to the client. 
We carry out two sets of experiments. In the first set, we 
profile the runtime cost of the service migration scheme 
with a fixed migration period. In the second set, we 
characterise how the migration period can be dynamically 
adjusted under various conditions. In each set of 
experiments, we use two configurations, one to tolerate a 
single faulty replica in each component (referred to as the 
f ¼ 1 configuration where there are four replicas in each 
component, except the trusted configuration manager, 
which employs three replicas) and the other to tolerate two 
faulty replicas in each component (referred to as the f ¼ 2 
configuration where there are seven replicas in each 
component, except the trusted configuration manager, 
which has five replicas). Up to eight concurrent clients are 
used in each run. 
4.1 Runtime cost of service migration 
To characterise the runtime cost of the service migration 
scheme, we measure the recovery time for a single replica with 
and without the presence of clients, and the impact of 
proactive migration on the system performance perceived by 
clients. In each run, the service migration interval is kept at 
10 s. The recovery time is determined by measuring the time 
elapsed between the following two events: (a) the primary 
sending the PRE-PREPARE message for the MIGRATION­
REQUEST and (b) the primary receiving a notification from 
the target standby node indicating that it has collected and 
applied the latest stable checkpoint. We refer to this time 
interval as the service migration latency. The impact on the 
system performance is measured at the client by counting the 
number of calls it has made during a period of 50 s, which is 
slightly longer than four rounds of service migration (so that 
all replicas have been proactively recovered once), with and 
without proactive migration-based recovery. 
Fig. 4 summarises the measured service migration latency 
with respect to various state sizes and the number of 
concurrent clients. Figs. 4a and 4c show the service 
migration latency for various state sizes (from 1 MB to 
about 80 MB) for the two configurations (labelled as ‘With 
f ¼ 1’ and ‘With f ¼ 2’), respectively. It is not surprising to 
see that the cost of migration is limited by the bandwidth 
Figure 4 Service migration latency with respect to various state sizes and number of concurrent clients 
a Service migration latency for different state sizes measured (1) when the replicas are idle (other than the service migration activity), 
labelled as ‘Without Client’ and (2) in the presence of one client, for the f ¼ 1 configuration 
b Impact of system load on migration latency for f ¼ 1 configuration 
c Migration latency with respect to state size for the f ¼ 2 configuration 
d Migration latency with respect to system load for the f ¼ 2 configuration 
available (100 Mbps), because in our experiment the time it 
takes to take a local checkpoint (to memory) and to restore 
one (from memory) is negligible. This is intentional for 
two reasons: (a) the checkpointing and restoration cost is 
very application dependent and (b) such a cost is the same 
regardless of the proactive recovery schemes used. The 
migration latency is slightly larger when the replication 
degree is higher, especially with the presence of a client. 
Furthermore, we measure the migration latency as a function 
of the system load in terms of the number of concurrent clients. 
The results for the two configurations are shown in Figs. 4b and 
4d. As can be seen, the migration latency increases more 
significantly for larger state when the system load is higher. 
When there are eight concurrent clients, the migration 
latency for a state size of 50 MB is close to 10 s. This 
observation suggests that if a fixed watchdog timer is used, 
the watchdog timeout must be set to a very conservative 
worst-case value. If the watchdog timeout is too short for the 
system to go through four rounds of proactive recovery (of 
f replicas at a time), there will be more than f replicas going 
through proactive recoveries concurrently, which will decrease 
the system availability, even without any fault. 
Fig. 5 shows the performance impact of proactive service 
migration as perceived by a single client in terms of the 
number of calls made in a 50-s interval. During this 
period, four rounds of migration would take place so that 
all replicas can be proactively recovered at least once. As 
can be seen, the impact of proactive migration on system 
performance is quite acceptable. For a state smaller than 
30 MB, the throughput is reduced by only 10% or less 
compared with the no-proactive-recovery case. 
4.2 Dynamic adjustment of migration 
interval 
To demonstrate the capability of dynamic adjustment of the 
migration interval, we carry out another set of experiments. 
We assume the following parameters are supplied by the user: 
† worst-case response time Toe0 ¼ 5 ms  
† worst-case migration latency T 0s ¼ 10 s 
† minimum number of requests processed in each migration 
round p0 ¼ 10 000. 
This gives a target availability of 83.3%. The objective of 
these experiments is to show how the migration interval 
changes under the following two scenarios: (a) different 
system loads due to the presence of concurrent clients and 
(b) different system loads due to state size changes. 
During runtime, our mechanism profiles the average response 
time Toe and the migration latency Ts, and  calculates  the  
appropriate number  of requests  to be processed  p for the next 
round of migration based on equation (2), which determines 
the migration timeout value for the next round of migration. 
The results for scenario (a) with the f ¼ 1 configuration are  
shown in Figs. 6(a) and 6(b), where (a) shows the p values 
and (b) illustrates the corresponding migration timeout values. 
When the replica state is kept at 5 and 10 MB, the given 
0minimum number of requests p ¼ 10 000 is used because 
the calculated p value to meet the target availability 
requirement is smaller. For the state size of 50 MB, a higher 
number of requests than p0 are processed in each migration 
interval in order to meet the availability requirement because 
the migration latency is very significant. It is interesting to 
note that for state sizes of 5 and 10 MB, the migration 
timeout value actually decreases when the number of 
concurrent clients increases. This might appear to be 
counterintuitive. However, it can be easily explained. This is 
an artefact caused by the aggressive batching mechanism in 
the BFT framework [2] we used. With batching, the cost of 
message ordering per request is reduced. Consequently, the 
response time for each request is reduced, which results in a 
smaller migration timeout value. (Recall that T does not oe 
include the queueing delay of the request being ordered.) 
Another interesting observation is that the migration timeout 
values determined at runtime are much smaller than the 
worst-case value except when the state size is large and 
the number of concurrent clients is significant. Figs. 6(c) 
and 6(d) present similar results for the f ¼ 2 configuration.  
Figure 5 Impact of service migration on system throughput 
a Number of calls made by a single client during a 50-s interval for various state sizes 
b Percentage reduction in system throughput for various state sizes 
Figure 6 Dynamic adaptation of migration interval 
a Number of requests processed in each round of migration for three different state sizes in the presence of different number of 
concurrent clients for the f ¼ 1 configuration 
b Corresponding migration interval with respect to the number of concurrent clients for the f ¼ 1 configuration 
c Number of requests processed in each round of migration under different number of clients for the f ¼ 2 configuration 
d Corresponding migration interval with respect to number of concurrent clients for the f ¼ 2 configuration 
When the replication degree is higher, the migration interval is 
slightly larger as expected. 
For many applications, their state size might gradually 
increase over time as they process more application requests. 
A larger state would mean larger migration latency, which 
normally would lead to a larger p value, as indicated in (2). 
Fig. 7 shows the results of the dynamic adaptation of 
migration interval in the presence of a single client, for both 
the f ¼ 1 and  f ¼ 2 configurations. As expected, when the 
0state size is relatively small (20 MB or below), p is used 
because the migration latency is small and the number of 
requests needed to meet the availability requirement is smaller 
than p0. As the state size increases further, a larger p value is 
needed to meet the availability requirement. Again, we show 
that the migration intervals dynamically determined are much 
smaller than the worst-case value except when the state size is 
very large. 
5 Related work 
Ensuring BFT for long-running systems is an extremely 
challenging task. Proactive recovery [14] is regarded as a 
fundamental technique to defend against mobile attackers, 
which might compromise multiple servers over time. The 
pioneering work in the context of BFT is carried out by 
Castro and Liskov [2] and Rodrigues and Liskov [6]. Our  
work is inspired by their work. The comparison of our 
scheme and closely related work has been provided in the 
Introduction section. 
Figure 7 Dynamic adaptation of migration interval 
a Number of requests processed in each round of migration when the replica state changes in the presence of a single client 
b Corresponding migration interval with respect to state size 
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Proactive recovery for intrusion tolerance has been studied 
in [15, 16] with the emphasis of confidentiality protection 
using proactive threshold cryptography [17]. Reboot is also 
used as the basis to recover compromised replicas, which 
suggests that such schemes may also suffer from similar 
problems as those in [2]. 
The idea of moving expensive operations off the critical 
execution path is a well-known system design strategy, and 
it has been exploited in other fault-tolerant systems, such as 
[10, 18, 19]. In our scheme, this principle is used to reduce 
the vulnerability window. 
The reliance on extra nodes beyond the 3f þ 1 active nodes 
in our scheme may somewhat relate to the use of 2f additional 
witness replicas in the fast Byzantine consensus algorithm 
[20]. However, the extra nodes are needed for completely 
different purposes. Nevertheless, one might suggest that we 
should utilise the extra standby nodes (if there are 2f or 
more of such nodes) and apply the fast Byzantine 
consensus algorithm for fast response time. While it is 
certainly possible to do so, it is effective only if the 
vulnerability window is very large because the sanitising 
operations (such as reboot), which can be time consuming, 
would now be in the critical path of proactive recovery. 
This appears to be orthogonal to the objective of this 
research. 
Finally, other researchers have carried out substantial work 
on the availability and reliability analysis of fault-tolerant 
systems, such as [21–25]. These results could potentially 
be used to enhance the migration interval determination 
algorithm of our scheme. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented a novel proactive recovery scheme 
based on service migration for long-running BFT systems. 
We described in detail the challenges and mechanisms 
needed for our migration-based proactive recovery to work. 
The primary benefit of our migration-based recovery 
scheme is a smaller vulnerability window during normal 
operation. When the system load is light, the migration 
interval can be dynamically adapted to a smaller value from 
the initial conservative value, which is usually set based on 
the worst-case scenario, and hence resulting in a smaller 
vulnerability window. Our scheme also shifts the time-
consuming repairing step out of the critical execution path, 
which also contributes to a smaller vulnerability window. 
We demonstrated the benefits of our scheme 
experimentally with a working prototype. For future work, 
we plan to enhance the features of the trusted configuration 
manager, in particular, the incorporation of the code 
attestation methods [26] into the fault detection 
mechanisms, and the application of the migration-based 
recovery scheme to practical systems such as networked file 
systems. 
7 Acknowledgments 
We sincerely thank the anonymous reviewers for their 
invaluable comments and suggestions. This research has 
been supported in part by the US NSF grant CNS 08­
21319 and by a Faculty Research Development award from 
Cleveland State University. 
8 References 
[1] LAMPORT L., SHOSTAK R., PEASE M.: ‘The Byzantine generals 
problem’, ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 1982, 4, (3),  
pp. 382–401 
[2] CASTRO M., LISKOV B.: ‘Practical Byzantine fault tolerance 
and proactive recovery’, ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 2002, 
20, (4), pp. 398–461 
[3] CASTRO M., RODRIGUES R., LISKOV B.: ‘BASE: using abstraction 
to improve fault tolerance’, ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 
2003, 21, (3), pp. 236–269 
[4] COWLING J., MYERS D., LISKOV B., RODRIGUES R., SHRIRA L.: ‘Hq  
replication: a hybrid quorum protocol for byzantine fault 
tolerance’. Proc. 7th Symp. Operating Systems Design and 
Implementations, Seattle,WA, November 2006, pp. 177–190 
[5] YIN J., MARTIN J.-P., VENKATARAMANI A., ALVISI L., DAHLIN M.: 
‘Separating agreement from execution for byzantine fault 
tolerant services’. Proc. ACM Symp. Operating Systems 
Principles, Bolton Landing, NY, 2003, pp. 253–267 
[6] RODRIGUES R., LISKOV B.: ‘Byzantine fault tolerance in long-
lived systems’. Proc. 2nd Workshop Future Directions in 
Distributed Computing, June 2004 
[7] SOUSA P., BESSANI A.N., CORREIA M., NEVES N.F., VERISSIMO P.: 
‘Resilient intrusion tolerance through proactive and 
reactive recovery’. Proc. IEEE Pacific Rim Dependable 
Computing Conf., 2007, pp. 373–380 
[8] SOUSA P., NEVES N.F., VERISSIMO P.: ‘Proactive resilience 
through architectural hybridization’. ACM Symp. Applied 
Computing, Dijon, France, 2006, pp. 686–690 
[9] SOUSA P., NEVES N.F., VERISSIMO P., SANDERS W.H.: ‘Proactive 
resilience revisited: the delicate balance between resisting 
intrusions and remaining available’. Proc. IEEE Symp. 
Reliable Distributed Systems, 2006, pp. 71–82 
[10] REISER H.P., KAPITZA R.: ‘Hypervisor-based efficient 
proactive recovery’. Proc. IEEE Symp. Reliable Distributed 
Systems, 2007, pp. 83–92 
[11] VAUGHAN-NICHOLS S.J.: ‘Virtualization sparks security 
concerns’, Computer, 2008, 41, (8), pp. 13–15 
[12] FISCHER M., LYNCH N., PATERSON M.: ‘Impossibility of 
distributed consensus with one faulty process’, J. ACM, 
1985, 32, (2), pp. 374–382 
[13] LAMPORT L.: ‘Paxos made simple’, ACM SIGACT News 
(Distributed Computing Column), 2005, 32, pp. 18–25 
[14] OSTROVSKY R., YUNG M.: ‘How to withstand mobile virus 
attacks’. Proc. ACM Symp. Principles of Distributed 
Computing, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 1991, pp. 51–59 
[15] MARSH M.A., SCHNEIDER F.B.: ‘Codex: a robust and secure 
secret distribution system’, IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. 
Comput., 2004, 1, (1), pp. 34–47 
[16] ZHOU L., SCHNEIDER F., VAN RENESSE R.: ‘Coca: a secure  
distributed on-line certification authority’, ACM Trans. 
Comput. Syst., 2002, 20, (4), pp. 329–368 
[17] CACHIN C., KURSAWE K., LYSYANSKAYA A., STROBL R.: 
‘Asynchronous verifiable secret sharing and proactive 
cryptosystems’. Proc. 9th ACM Conf. Computer and 
Communications Security,Washington, DC, 2002, pp. 88–97 
[18] MALEK M., POLZE A., WERNER M.: ‘A  framework for  
responsive parallel computing in network-based systems’. 
Proc. Int. Workshop Advanced Parallel Processing 
Technologies, Bejing, China, September 1995, pp. 335–343 
[19] POLZE A., SCHWARZ J., MALEK M.: ‘Automatic generation 
of fault-tolerant corba-services’. Proc. Technology of 
Object-Oriented Languages and Systems, Santa Barbara, 
CA, 2000, IEEE Computer Society Press, pp. 205–213 
[20] MARTIN J., ALVISI L.: ‘Fast byzantine consensus’, IEEE Trans. 
Dependable Secur. Comput., 2006, 3, (3), pp. 202–215 
[21] DAI Y., LEVITIN G., TRIVEDI K.: ‘Performance and reliability of 
tree-structured grid services considering data dependence 
and failure correlation’, IEEE Trans. Comput., 2007, 56, 
(7), pp. 925–936 
[22] DAI Y., PAN Y., ZOU X.: ‘A hierarchical modeling and analysis 
for grid service reliability’, IEEE Trans. Comput., 2007, 56, 
(5), pp. 681–691 
[23] DAI Y., XIE M., LONG Q., NG S.: ‘Uncertainty  analysis in  
software reliability modeling by bayesian analysis with 
maximum-entropy principle’, IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng., 
2007, 33, (11), pp. 781–795 
[24] DAI Y., XIE M., POH K.: ‘Modeling and analysis of correlated 
software failures of multiple types’, IEEE Trans. Reliab., 
2005, 54, (1), pp. 100–106 
[25] DAI Y., XIE M., WANG X.: ‘Heuristic algorithm for reliability 
modeling and analysis of grid systems’, IEEE Trans. Syst., 
Man Cybern., Part A, 2007, 37, (2), pp. 189–200 
[26] CHEN B., MORRIS R.: ‘Certifying program execution with 
secure processors’. Proc. 9th Workshop Hot Topics in 
Operating Systems, Lihue, HI, May 2003, pp. 133–138 
